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Abstract 19 
In this paper, we consider the issue of the secure transmissions for the cognitive radio-based 20 
Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) with wireless energy harvesting. In these systems, a primary 21 
transmitter (PT) will transmit its sensitive medical information to a primary receiver (PR) by a 22 
multi-antenna-based secondary transmitter (ST), where we consider that a potential 23 
eavesdropper may listen the PT’s sensitive information. In the meanwhile, the ST also 24 
transmits its own information concurrently by utilizing spectrum sharing. We aim to propose a 25 
novel scheme for jointly designing the optimal parameters, i.e., energy harvesting (EH) time 26 
ratio and secure beamforming vectors, for maximizing the primary secrecy transmission rate 27 
while guaranteeing secondary transmission requirement. For solving the non-convex 28 
optimization problem, we transfer the problem into convex optimization form by adopting the 29 
semi-definite relaxation (SDR) method and Charnes-Cooper transformation technique. Then, 30 
the optimal secure beamforming vectors and energy harvesting duration can be obtain easily 31 
by utilizing the CVX tools. According to the simulation results of secrecy transmission rate, 32 
i.e., secrecy capacity, we can observe that the proposed protocol for the considered system 33 
model can effectively promote the primary secrecy transmission rate when compared with 34 
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traditional zero-forcing (ZF) scheme, while ensuring the transmission rate of the secondary 35 
system. 36 
I. Introduction 37 
With the rapid development of wireless communication and networking technologies, an 38 
increasing number of devices need to be connected globally and communicate automatically. 39 
Therefore, the emerging of the Internet of Things (IoT) as a promising paradigm can achieve a 40 
fusing of the various technologies in 5G communication systems, which have been widely 41 
applied in smart cities, agriculture, and environment monitoring [1-6]. Moreover, the medical 42 
care and health care have becoming one of the most popular applications based on the IoT [7,8], 43 
named the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT), which can collect the data from the medical 44 
devices and applications to improve the treatment effect, disease diagnosis, and patient 45 
experience, while reduce decrease misdiagnosis rate and treatment cost. According to the 46 
investigation of relevant organizations, the market share of IoMT will reach to roughly 117 47 
billion dollars by the end of 2020 [9]. However, with the increasing use of IoMT equipment, 48 
the huge demand for radio spectrum has become a serious problem. In addition, the allocated 49 
radio spectrums are often underutilized due to the inflexible spectrum policies [10]. In order to 50 
facilitate an effective utilization of spectrum resources, cognitive radio technology was 51 
introduced in which unlicensed nodes could communicate with each other in an opportunistic 52 
manner over a licensed frequency band without interrupting the primary transmissions [11-13]. 53 
Yet, power supply is another key constraint on the development of IoMT. In general, an IoMT 54 
system usually contains a large number of small-size devices that are battery-powered and 55 
difficult to be replaced. In order to solve this problem, wireless-powered technology has been 56 
paid high attention. The devices with EH capabilities can convert energy from the surrounding 57 
environment into electricity for data transmission, such as solar, wind, or RF signals [14]. 58 
Especially with the synchronous development of antenna and circuit designs, wireless EH 59 
based on RF signals has attracted more attention due to its advantages of wireless, low cost and 60 
small form implementation [15-17]. Furthermore, the amount of harvested energy is in 61 
milliwatts, which is enough to power small-size IoMT devices, such as medical data sensors 62 
for short-distance transmissions. Therefore, the combination of cognitive radio and EH in 63 
medical wireless sensor networks can greatly improve both the spectrum and energy 64 
efficiencies. 65 
Although adopting cognitive radio technology with EH can effectively improve the transfer 66 
efficiency for IoMT, the variety of medical devices in healthcare fields will introduce several 67 
security problems [18]. Since the energy-constraint sensors need to perform energy harvesting 68 
and then forward the sensitive patient data wirelessly, the other illegal sensors may be the 69 
potential eavesdropper to listen such confidential messages [19]. As an emerging field, a large 70 
number of healthcare manufacturers are rushing to utilize the IoT solutions in some 71 
applications without considering security. As a result, there will bring new security problems 72 
related to confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Furthermore, due to the limited capabilities, 73 
such as lack of effective computation and sufficient power supply, many sensors in IoMT 74 
cannot embed encryption algorithm. Therefore, these lack of strong encryption across medical 75 
sensors make themselves to be discovered and exploited by malicious users easily. 76 
Hindawi Template version: Apr19 
 
 3 
A. Related work 77 
To take the full advantage of the potential gains for wireless EH, the researchers developed 78 
simultaneous wireless information and power transmission (SWIPT) schemes in wireless 79 
networks that utilize RF signals to transmit energy and information to receivers. Authors in 80 
[20] applied the SWPIT in relay interference channels for multiple source-destination pairs 81 
communication system, where each pair of link has a dedicated EH relay serving for relaying 82 
transmission. On this basis, the optimal power allocation ratio for each relay was deduced by 83 
adopting the distributed power allocation framework of game theory. A SWIPT scheme for 84 
amplify-and-forward (AF) bidirectional relaying network based on OFDM was proposed in 85 
[21], where a wireless-powered relay performed information processing and EH by utilizing 86 
two disjoint subcarriers groups, respectively. Based on the decode-and-forward (DF) mode, the 87 
authors in [22] designed an optimal resource allocation strategy to maximize the energy 88 
efficiency with non-linear SWIPT model under a two-way relay network. For cognitive radio 89 
networks with energy harvesting in IoT systems,  the authors in [23] analyzed the outage 90 
probability of a random underlay cognitive network with EH-based assistant relay. The two 91 
main challenges for cognitive radio sensor networks in IoT systems were considered in [24], 92 
where the authors developed an architecture and proposed an energy management strategy for 93 
achieving balance between the transmission performance of the networks and operational life. 94 
In [25], the authors considered the insecure characteristic of electronic medical records based 95 
on eHealth systems, and then proposed a corresponding secure encrypted scheme to ensure the 96 
data security. In [26], the authors investigated an overlaid spectrum sharing network with 97 
SWIPT for IoT systems, where a pair of SWIPT-based devices as the relays to assist the 98 
transmission of the primary signals. Considering information security in cognitive radio-based 99 
IoT systems, the authors in [27] presented a novel algorithm for channel allocation with time-100 
sensitive data under the scenario of jamming attacks. A secure relay selection scheme based on 101 
channel state information and battery state information was proposed for energy harvesting-102 
based cognitive radio networks in IoT networks [28]. 103 
B. Motivation and Contributions 104 
Unlike the mentioned literates [27] and [28] in above, we consider an actual application 105 
scenarios for sanatorium or hospital under the cognitive radio-based IoTM networks to protect 106 
the patients’ sensitive medical information. Considering an indoor environment for sanatorium 107 
or hospital, where the PT intends to transmit its sensitive medical data to the PR, while the ST 108 
performs data monitoring and transfer to the SR. In this scenario, the node ST has lack of 109 
energy supply and need to scavenge energy from the primary transmitter, while ST can be 110 
regarded as the relay to opportunistically access the licensed primary channel. Meanwhile, we 111 
assume that an attacker is located near the PR to eavesdrop the PT’s medical data. Thus, to 112 
enable the secure transmission of the PT’s signal, we investigate a typical cognitive radio 113 
network with wireless-powered relay (CRN-WPR) and jointly design the optimal EH time ratio 114 
and secure beamforming vectors to maximize the secrecy transmission rate of the primary 115 
system, while effectively guarantee the secondary transmission rate. The main contributions 116 
are summarized as follows: 117 
 We propose a corresponding protocol for EH and secrecy information transmission for a 118 
cognitive radio-based IoMT system, where the relay node ST is equipped with multiple-119 
antenna to perform EH at first and then transfers the sensitively primary signal with DF 120 
processing to the destination in security with its own signal. 121 
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 In order to protect the sensitive medical data sending from the PT, we formulate the 122 
optimization problem based on maximizing the secrecy transmission rate of the primary 123 
system while ensuring the transmission requirement of the secondary system. We adopt 124 
SDR and Charnes-Cooper transformation to transform the non-convex optimization 125 
problem into a convex optimization problem to find a solution for the optimization 126 
problem. A corresponding algorithm is then developed. In addition, the zero-forcing (ZF) 127 
scheme is also applied to solve the optimization problem as a benchmark. 128 
 The numerical results of the influence for the secrecy transmission rate on the primary 129 
system under different system parameters are given, such as primary transmission power, 130 
number of antennas, and transmission distance, etc. The results demonstrate excellent 131 
secure transmission performance with proposed scheme than ZF scheme. 132 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The section II introduces the system model and 133 
transmission protocol. Section III formulates the optimization problem and proposes the 134 
corresponding solution with secure beamforming. Furthermore, the ZF scheme is also adopted 135 
to solve the optimization as a benchmark. The section IV presents the simulation results and 136 
corresponding analyses. The section V summarizes this paper. 137 
Notations: Throughout this paper, let ( )
H
  denote the conjugate transpose. I presents the identity matrix with 138 
appropriate dimension.  x
+
 represents the maximum value between x  and 0, while *x  denotes the optimal 139 
value of x . x
⊥  denotes the orthogonal projection onto the orthogonal complement of the column space of x . 140 
  denotes the Euclidean norm of a vector or a matrix and   denotes the magnitude of a channel or the absolute 141 
value of a complex number. Table I lists the fundamental notations and parameters. 142 
 143 
Table 1: List of parameters and their physical meaning/expression. 144 
Parameter Meaning/Expression 
PSTh , SSh , SMEh , SPRh  1N   complex channel vectors of the PT-ST, ST-SR, ST-ME, and 
ST-PR, respectively 
PPh , PMEh  Channel coefficients of the PT-PR and the PT-ME  
  Duration of energy harvesting 
T Total block time 
ex , Px  Transmit dedicated energy signal and confidential signal at PT 
ˆ
Px , Sx  Decoded primary signal and secondary signal at ST 
PP  PT’s transmission power 
STn , PRn , MEn , SRn  Received AWGN at ST, PR, ME, and SR 
  Energy conversion efficiency from signal power to circuit power 
STR , PRR , MER , SRR  Achievable rate at ST, PR, ME, and SR, respectively 
PRR , MER  Overall transmission rates at PR and ME 
SECR  Secrecy rate of the primary system 
Pv , Sv  Relaying beamforming vector and cognitive beamforming vector 
0STE   Initial power at the ST 
Sr  Minimal transmission rate requirement for the secondary system 
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  An auxiliary optimization variable to bound the achievable rate of 
the eavesdropper ME 
   Power allocation coefficient 
II. System Model and Transmission Protocol 145 
A. System Model 146 
We consider a cognitive radio network with wireless-powered relay (CRN-WPR) as shown in 147 
Fig. 1. The primary system is composed of a primary transmitter (PT) and a primary receiver 148 
(PR), while the secondary system consists of a secondary transmitter (ST) and a secondary 149 
receiver (SR). There also exists an eavesdropper (ME) whose purpose is to intercept the PT’s 150 
confidential data in the range of the primary system, where PT intends to send a confidential 151 
data to PR. The primary system may be regard as the uplink of the transmission system with 152 
poor channel quality or lower rate. Therefore, the ST is willing to act as the relay for assisting 153 
the primary transmission while delivering its own data. We assume that the PT has a fixed 154 
power supply, while the ST may have limited battery storage, so it needs to obtain energy from 155 
the received RF signal. The ST is equipped with N antennas and other nodes operates in half-156 
duplex mode with single antenna. 157 
All channels undergo the flat block Rayleigh fading channel, which is characterized by quasi-158 
static state of the channel in one transmission-slot and independent change in different 159 
transmission-slots. Let PSTh , SSh , SMEh , and SPRh  be the 1N   complex channel vectors of the 160 
PT-ST, ST-SR, ST-ME, and ST-PR, respectively. The channel coefficients of the PT-PR and 161 
the PT-ME links are denoted by PPh  and PMEh . The global channel state information is 162 
available for the system, which is a common assumption in physical-layer security literatures 163 
[29,30]. 164 
 165 
Figure 1: System model of a CRN-WPR. The green line denotes the first phase for energy harvesting, the blue 166 
lines and red lines represent the second and third information transmission phases from the PT and ST, 167 
respectively. 168 
B. Energy Harvesting and Information Transmission 169 
As depicted in Fig. 1, the EH and information transmission in one transmission-slot includes 170 
three phases. In the first phase, the PT uses a portion of time ( )( )0,1   of the total block 171 
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time T to transmit the dedicated energy signal ex  to ST for EH. Thus, the received signal at the 172 
ST can be expressed as 173 
I ,ST P PST e STy P x= +h n                                                    (1) 174 
where PP  represents the transmission power of the node PT, ex  denotes the unit-power energy 175 
signal, ( )~ 0,ST STn I  is the received additive Gaussian white noise (AWGN) with 176 
variance of ST . For definiteness and without loss of generality, we assume 1T = . Thus, the 177 
amount of harvested energy at the ST can be calculated as 178 
2
,ST P PSTE P= h                                                      (2) 179 
where  0,1  is energy conversion efficiency. Note that the amount of scavenged energy 180 
from noise is neglected because the harvested energy from the thermal noise can be negligible 181 
compared to the energy signal. 182 
At the second phase of duration ( )1 2T− , the PT transmits confidential signal Px  with 183 
power PP , the received signal at the ST is thus given as 184 
II .ST P PST P STy P x= +h n                                                     (3) 185 
The achievable rate STR  can be derived as 186 
( )
2
2
1
= log 1 .
2
P PST
ST
ST
PT
R


 −
 + 
 
 
h
                                          (4) 187 
Due to the nature of the information broadcast, the PR and eavesdropper ME can also receive 188 
the signal Px , the received signals at the PR and ME are given as 189 
II
II
,
,
PR P PP P PR
ME P PME P ME
y P h x n
y P h x n
= +
= +
                                                 (5) 190 
respectively. Here, ( )~ 0,PR PRn   and ( )~ 0,ME MEn   denote AWGN at PR and ME, 191 
respectively. 192 
During the third phase ( )1 2T− , the node ST first decodes the received primary confidential 193 
signal ˆPx  based on DF processing, and then simultaneously forwards ˆPx  and its own signal 194 
Sx  by utilizing the beamforming vectors 
1N
P
v  and 1NS
v , respectively. Therefore, 195 
the corresponding received signal at the PR and eavesdropper ME are expressed as 196 
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III
III
ˆ ,
ˆ ,
H H
PR SPR P P SPR S S PR
H H
ME SME P P SME S S PR
y x x
y x x
= + +
= + +
h v h v n
h v h v n
                                         (6) 197 
respectively. The PR attempts to retrieve ˆPx  from 
III
PRy  in the presence of the secondary signal 198 
Sx . In the meanwhile, the eavesdropper also intends to intercept signal ˆPx . Thus, the 199 
achievable rates at the PR and ME in last two phases can be expressed as 200 
( )
( )
22
2 2
22
2 2
1
log 1 ,
2
1
log 1 .
2
H
SPR PP PP
PR
H
PR SPR S PR
H
SME PP PME
ME
H
ME SME S ME
P hT
R
P hT
R

 

 
 −  = + +
 + 
 −  = + +
 + 
h v
h v
h v
h v
                            (7) 201 
At the SR, the received signal is given by 202 
ˆ .H HSR SS S S SS P P SRy x x= + +h v h v n                                              (8) 203 
Similar to the PR, the SR treats ˆPx  as interference and then detects the desired secondary signal 204 
Sx . The achievable rate at the SR is given by 205 
( )
2
2 2
1
log 1 .
2
H
SS S
SR
H
SS P SR
T
R


 −  = +
 + 
h v
h v
                                       (9) 206 
III. Problem Formulation and Secure Beamforming 207 
In this section, we first define the secrecy rate of the primary system, which is a critical 208 
performance index to illustrate the transmission security of the sensitive data [31, 32], and then 209 
formulate the optimization problem with maximizing the primary secrecy rate aiming to satisfy 210 
the minimum achievable rate for the secondary system and power constraint of the  relay node 211 
ST. In order to effectively obtain the optimal parameters to keep data in safety, we also propose 212 
a mathematically efficient optimization scheme to solve the problem with two-stage procedure. 213 
A. Problem Formulation 214 
Based on the DF cooperative communication scheme, the overall transmission rates at PR and 215 
ME equal to the minimum rate of the two-hop transmissions, respectively [32], i.e., 216 
 
 
min , ,
min , .
PR ST PR
ME ST ME
R R R
R R R
=
=
                                                (10) 217 
Based on the definition of [33], the secrecy rate of the primary system for the considered 218 
secrecy CRN-WPR can be expressed as 219 
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.SEC PR MER R R
+
 = −                                                   (11) 220 
Substituting the results of Equation (8) into Equation (9), the overall primary secrecy rate is 221 
then given as 222 
 min , .SEC ST PR MER R R R
+
= −                                          (12) 223 
In the following, the EH ratio and secure beamforming vectors are jointly designed by 224 
maximizing the primary secrecy rate subject to the minimum achievable rate for the SR and 225 
power constraint of the ST. Mathematically, the considered optimization problem can be 226 
represent as (P1): 227 
 
( )
, ,
2
02 2
max min ,
. .
C1: ,
2
C2 : ,
1
C3: 0 1.
P S
ST PR ME
SR S
P PST ST
P S
R R R
s t
R r
P E




+
−  

+
+ 
−
 
v v
h
v v
                                (13) 228 
In (13), C1 means that the achievable rate of SR should be larger than or equal to minimum 229 
rate Sr . C2 denotes the transmission power constraint at the ST with 0STE  representing the 230 
initial power at the ST. 231 
B. Optimal Secure Beamforming Design 232 
According to the analysis of formula (13), we can observe that (P1) is a non-convex function, 233 
which is difficult to derive three optimal variables ( ), ,P S v v  concurrently. In the followings, 234 
this section proposes a mathematically efficient optimization scheme with two-stage procedure 235 
for solving the (P1): 236 
 In the stage I, we obtain the optimal secure beamforming ( )* *,P Sv v  for any given energy 237 
harvesting duration  ; 238 
 In the stage II, the global optimal solution ( )* * *, ,P S v v  can be found based on one-239 
dimension search over  . 240 
In the stage I, the maximization of the primary secrecy rate is equivalent to maximizing the 241 
achievable rate of the PR subject to an alternative upper bound on the achievable rate of ME. 242 
Thus, for a given 0 = , ( )0STR   is the constant value and the problem (P1) can be 243 
transformed into follows problem (P2): 244 
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( )
( )
( )
( )
22
0
2 2
,
2
0
2 2
2
0 02 2
0
22
0
2 2
1
max log 1
2
. .
1
C1: log 1 ,
2
2
C2 :
1
1
C3: log 1 ,
2
P S
H
SPR PP PP
H
PR SPR S PR
H
SS S
S
H
SS P SR
P PST ST
P S
H
SME PP PME
H
ME SME S ME
P hT
s t
T
r
P E
P hT

 


 


 
 −
 + +
 + 
 −  + 
 + 
+
+ 
−
 −  + +  
 + 
v v
h v
h v
h v
h v
h
v v
h v
h v
，
                     (14) 245 
where   represents an auxiliary optimization variable to bound the achievable rate of the 246 
eavesdropper ME, thus the maximum primary secure rate can be obtained by adjusting value 247 
of  . The optimal value of *  can be founded by one-dimension search since it is a non-248 
negative value. Note that the optimization problem (P2) is still non-convex concerning with 249 
beamforming vectors Pv  and Sv . 250 
Considering ( )2log x  is monotonically increasing function of x  and defining 
H
SPR SPR SPRh h=H , 251 
H
SME SME SMEh h=H , 
H
SS SS SSh h=H , 
H
P P P=V v v , and 
H
S S S=V v v , the problem (P2) can be denoted 252 
as a fractional programming problem, but the objective function is still non-convex since two 253 
optimization variables PV  and SV are existed in numerator and denominator of objective 254 
function, respectively. To solve the problem (P2) more effectively, the fractional programming 255 
problem can be equivalently reformulated to a convex SDR problem by utilizing Charnes-256 
Cooper transformation [34]. Thus, we let 257 
( )
1
,
tr SPR S SR


=
+H V
                                                  (15) 258 
while defining P P=V V  and S S=V V , the corresponding SDR of problem (P2) can be 259 
rewritten as (P3) 260 
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( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
, ,
2
0 0
0
max tr
. .
C1: tr =1,
C2 : tr tr ,
2
C3: tr tr
1
C4 : tr tr ,
C5 : 0, 0, 0,
P S
SPR P
SPR S SR
SS S S SS P S SR
P PST ST
P S
SME P e SME S e ME
P S
s t
P E


 
  

 

+
−  
+
+ 
−
−  

v v
H V
H V
H V H V
h
V V
H V H V
V V
                             (16) 261 
where 0
2
1
2 1
Sr
S
− = −  and 0
22
1
2 1
P PME
e
ME
P h


− = − − . 262 
It must be noted that SDR cannot guarantee to derive the optimal solution ( )* *,P Sv v  with rank-263 
one. In the followings, the first step is to prove that the rank of optimal *PV  equals to one, then 264 
we propose a method to structure the optimal *SV  with rank-one when the rank of SV  is greater 265 
than one. 266 
Let 1 , 2 , 3 , and 4  represents the Lagrange multipliers, i.e., dual variables, related to 267 
constraints C1 to C4 in Equation (16), respectively. Thus, the corresponding Lagrange function 268 
of problem (P3) can be expressed as 269 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 4, , , , , tr tr ,P S P P      = + +V V V V                                (17) 270 
where 271 
2 3 4= H ,SPR S SS SME   −  − −H I H                                         (18) 272 
1 2 3 4H ,SPR SS e SME    = − + − + H I H                                    (19) 273 
and   denotes the residual information that is not related for the proof. According to the 274 
definition of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions and Lagrange function of problem (P3), we thus 275 
have 276 
* * * *0, 0.P S = =V V                                                     (20) 277 
Assuming the harvested energy and initial energy are all used for secure beamforming 278 
transmission in the third phase, the power constraint C3 in Equation (16) is activated with 279 
equality, thus the dual variable 
*
3 0  . Since the transmission channel vectors 0SSH  and 280 
0SMEH , we can derive that ( )* * *2 3 4rank S SS SME N  −  − − =H I H . Furthermore, since 281 
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( )rank 1SPR H , it follows that ( )*rank 1N  − . Based on Equation (20), we thus obtain 282 
( )*rank =1PV . 283 
Define * * * * *1 2 3 4= SPR SS SME    − − − +H H I H , thus we have 284 
* * *
2= +2 .SS   H                                                        (21) 285 
Since 0SPRH , 0SSH , and 0SMEH , we can obtain that 286 
( )* * *1 2 3rank SPR SS N  − − − =H H I . Moreover, since ( )rank 1SME H , it can be derived that 287 
( )*rank 1N  − . 288 
 If ( )*rank =N , we can obtain that ( )*rank = 1N − , thus it follows from Equation (20) 289 
that ( )*rank =1SV  and *SV  is equal to Haww , where 1Nw   denotes the spanning null 290 
space of 
*  and 0a  . Thus, the corresponding optimal value of (P3) is ( )* * * *P S V V， ; 291 
 If ( )*rank = 1N − , we can observe that ( )*rank 1S V  and thus it requires constructing a 292 
new solution with rank-one. First, we obtain the orthonormal basis 1Nu   of the null 293 
base of * , which is defined as * =0u  and ( )rank 1u = . Then, based on the expression of 294 
* , we can further derive that 0SSu =H . Thus, the optimal solution of 
*
SV  is given by 295 
 296 
* = ,H HS buu aww+V                                                 (22) 297 
where 0b  , =1w , and =0Hw u . Finally, the optimal result of *ˆ SV  with rank-one can be 298 
rewritten as * *ˆ = HS S buu−V V . Thus, the reconstructed optimal solution for (P3) is 299 
( )* * * *ˆ,P S V V . 300 
For fixed 0=  , the optimal solutions ( )* * *, ,P S V V  can be obtained through one-dimension 301 
search   based on the following equation 302 
( ) ( )
0
* * *
=
, , =arg max problem P3 ,P S
 
 V V                                       (23) 303 
thus the optimal secure beamforming vectors ( )* *,P Sv v  can be obtained by adopting 304 
eigenvalue decomposition (EVD) of  
* *
P V  and 
* *
S V . 305 
In order to obtain the global optimal solution for problem (P1) in the second stage, one-306 
dimension search related to   is then utilized. The optimal solution is chosen from the 307 
following equation 308 
( )
( )
( )* * * *
0,1
, , , = arg max problem P1 .P S



 v v                                  (24) 309 
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The whole algorithm process can be described as follows: 310 
Algorithm 1  Optimal Secure Beamforming Design 
Initialize 0=   and 0=  ; Define max  as a large positive real number,   and   are 
all small positive real numbers as the iterative steps for one-dimension search. 
1: for a given 0=   do S1-S4 
2:      S1: Given 0=  , then solve problem (P3) and derive the optimal solution ( )* * *,,P S V V  
by utilizing CVX tools; 
3:     S2: Obtain optimal ( )* *,P SV V  through the following procedures; 
4:       if ( )*rank 1P =V  and ( )*rank 1S =V , then 
5:     The optimal solution for problem (P3) is ( )* * * *P S V V， ; 
6:       else 
7:      Reconstruct an optimal solution ( )* * * *ˆ,P S V V  for problem (P3) with ( )*rank 1P =V  
and ( )*ˆrank 1S =V  based on Equation (22); 
8:       end if 
9:     S3: Let = +     when max    and then go to S1-S2; 
10:  S4: Choose the optimal solution ( )* * *, ,P S V V  from Equation (23) and derive optimal 
secure beamforming vectors ( )* *,P SV V  by performing EVD. 
11: end for 
12: Update = +    and   S1-S4; 
      Choose the optimal solution ( )* * * *, , ,P S  v v  based on Equation (24). 
C. Secure Beamforming based on Zero-forcing Rule 311 
This section investigates another secure beamforming solution based on Zero-forcing (ZF) 312 
rule as a benchmark, which the primary transmission will not be interfered by other 313 
transmissions. Therefore, based on the criterion of ZF rule [35], the beamforming vectors 314 
,S ZFv  and ,P ZFv  for the primary and secondary systems should be in the null space of SPR
⊥
h  315 
and SS
⊥
h , respectively, i.e., 
, 0
H
SPR S ZF =h v  and , 0
H
SS P ZF =h v . Since there exists an 316 
eavesdropper in the system to listen the primary’s confidential information, so that the 317 
beamforming ,P ZFv  should also be in the null space of SME
⊥
h , i.e., 
, 0
H
SME P ZF =h v . In order to 318 
be fair in secondary transmission power, we further define , ,ˆ=P ZF ST P ZFPv v  and 319 
( ), ,ˆ= 1S ZF ST S ZFP−v v  with , ,ˆ ˆ 1
H
P ZF P ZF =v v  and , ,ˆ ˆ 1
H
S ZF S ZF =v v , where   represents the 320 
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power allocation coefficient and ( ) ( )2 0= 2 1ST P PST STP P E + −h  denotes the secondary 321 
transmission power. Based on Equations (13) and (14), the optimization problem based on ZF 322 
rule can be formulated as (P4): 323 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
, ,
22
,
2
ˆ ˆ,
2
,
2
2
2
, , ,
ˆ1
max log 1
2
. .
ˆ1
C1: log 1 ,
2
1
C2 : log 1 ,
2
ˆ ˆ ˆC3: 0, 0, 0,
C4 : 0 1.
+
1
S ZP ZF F
H
P PP SPR P ZF
PR
H
SS S
T
ZF
S
SR
P PME
ME
H H H
SP S
S
S
R S ZF S P ZF SME
T
P ZF
P h PT
s t
PT
r
P hT








 −  +
 
 
 −  + 
 
 
 −
 +   
 
 
= = =

−

v v
h v
h v
h v h v h v
                            (25) 324 
Based on the objective function of the optimization problem (P4), we can observe that the 325 
optimal ,ˆ P ZFv  should maximize the primary transmission rate under the constraint C3. Thus, 326 
the optimal ,P ZFv  can be obtained by utilizing the following optimization problem: 327 
,
2
,
, ,
ˆmax
ˆ ˆ. .   0, 0,
P ZF
H
SPR P ZF
H H
SS P ZF SME P ZFs t = =
v
h v
h v h v
                                          (26) 328 
Since both the constraint functions in Equation (26) include ,ˆ P ZFv , we thus can define a new 329 
matrix = ;H HS SS SME  H h h  and the constraint function can be rewritten as ,ˆ =0S P ZFH v . To 330 
satisfy the new constraint, ,ˆ P ZFv  can be obtained by solving the orthogonal value of SH , 331 
which means that ,ˆ P ZFv  should be the null space of SH . To obtain the maximization of 332 
2
,
ˆH
SPR P ZFh v , the optimal 
*
,
ˆ
P ZFv  should be chosen the one which is in the direction of the 333 
orthogonal projection of 
H
SPRh  on to the subspace S
⊥
H , where the optimal *
,
ˆ
P ZFv  is given by 334 
2
*
,
2
ˆ = .
H
S S
SPR
S
P ZF
H
S S
SPR
S
 
− 
 
 
 
− 
 
 
H H
I h
H
v
H H
I h
H
                                                 (27) 335 
Similarly, the optimal *
,
ˆ
S ZFv  can be derived by analyzing the constraint function 336 
,
ˆ 0HSPR S ZF =h v  in Equation (25), where the 
*
,
ˆ
S ZFv  should be the null space of SPR
⊥
h , i.e., *
,
ˆ
S ZFv  337 
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belongs to the subspace SPR
⊥
h . Here, we try to maximize the 
2
,
ˆH
SS S ZFh v  so that more ST’s 338 
transmission power can be used to transfer primary data to effectively ensure the secure 339 
transmission of information in the primary system. Therefore, the optimal *
,
ˆ
S ZFv  can be 340 
derived as 341 
2
*
,
2
ˆ = .
H
SPR SPR
SS
SPR
S ZF
H
SPR SPR
SS
SPR
 
− 
 
 
 
− 
 
 
h h
I h
h
v
h h
I h
h
                                               (28) 342 
According to (25), we can find that the objective function is an increasing function while C1 343 
is a decreasing function with the increase of  , we can obtain the optimal *  through 344 
deriving the upper-bound of  . Therefore, the optimal *  can be expressed as 345 
( )
,
2
1
*
2
*
1
ˆ
2
=1 .
S
H
S Z
r
T
S S
R
T F
S
SP

 
−
 
 −
−  
 
 
h v
                                             (29) 346 
Then, the optimal energy harvesting duration *  and *  can be derived by adopting one-347 
dimension search. 348 
IV. Simulations and Analyses of Security Transmission Performance 349 
In this section, we will verify security transmission performance of the primary and 350 
transmission efficiency of secondary system by comparing the proposed scheme and ZF-based 351 
scheme. Unless stated otherwise, we assume that all noise power are normalized to unity, i.e., 352 
1PR SR ME  = = = . We also consider a scenario where the transmission distance between the 353 
PT and PR is 8 m, while the distance between the ST and SR is 3 m. Moreover, the ST is 354 
equipped with 4 antennas and the energy harvesting efficiency is set as =0.5 . The 355 
transmission channel can be modeled as 2 jwh d e

−
=  with d and =3.5  denoting the distance 356 
and path loss exponent, respectively [36]. The minimum transmission rate of the secondary 357 
system and maximal auxiliary optimization variable are set to be =0.5 bit/s/HzSr  and 358 
max =1.0 bit/s/Hz , respectively. 359 
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 360 
Figure 2: The secrecy rate of the primary system with respect to the primary transmission power PP for different 361 
initial energy at the ST. The antenna number N=4, dPST=4 m, dSPR=dPP-dPST, dPME=dPP. 362 
 363 
Figure 2 illustrates the secrecy rate of the primary system with respect to the primary 364 
transmission power for different initial energy at the ST. In this figure, both the secrecy rates 365 
of the primary system with proposed scheme and ZF scheme are improved with the increase of 366 
primary transmission power, respectively. Moreover, the proposed scheme outperforms the ZF 367 
scheme in terms of the primary’s secrecy rate. With the lower primary transmission power, the 368 
superiority of the proposed scheme is obviously and the primary secrecy rates with both 369 
schemes are close in high primary transmission power. With the increase of the initial energy 370 
at the ST, the secrecy rate gets better as shown in Figure 2 since the more transmission power 371 
will be utilized to assist the transmission of the primary signals. 372 
 373 
Figure 3 compares the secrecy rates of the primary system with proposed scheme and ZF 374 
scheme against the antenna number at the ST. Obviously, with the increase of the antenna 375 
number, the secrecy rates gets better continually since more antenna will result in a higher 376 
spatial reuse efficiency. Similarly, the primary secrecy rate is always high for the proposed 377 
scheme. 378 
 379 
Figure. 3: The secrecy rate of the primary system with respect to the number of antenna at the ST. PP=10dB, 380 
PST0=0dB. dPST=4 m, dSS=2 m, dSPR=dPP-dPST, dSME=dSPR, dPME=dPP. 381 
 382 
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 383 
Figure. 4: The secrecy rate of the primary system with respect to the distance between the PT and ST. PP=10dB, 384 
PST0=0dB, dSS=2 m, dSPR=dPP-dPST, dSME=dSPR, dPME=dPP. The antenna number N=4. 385 
 386 
Figure 4 shows the primary secrecy rates with the proposed scheme and ZF scheme against the 387 
transmission distance between the PT and ST. From this figure, we can observe that the 388 
proposed scheme is superiority to the ZF scheme in term of the primary secrecy rate, regardless 389 
the position of the ST. With the increase of the dPST, the primary secrecy rates first become 390 
better and then become worse. When the transmission distance dPST is short, the secrecy rates 391 
get better with the increase of the dPST because the more energy will be harvested for signal 392 
transmission and shorter distance for primary signal transferring. However, when the distance 393 
dPST is longer, the secrecy rates get worse since the amount of harvested energy will be 394 
decreased and more path-loss will result in a negative effect for the ST to process the PT’s 395 
signal. Furthermore, we can obtain that the optimal positions of the ST are roughly 3m and 4m 396 
for the proposed scheme and ZF scheme, respectively. 397 
 398 
 399 
Figure. 5: The secrecy rate of the primary system with respect to the initialized transmission power PST0 at the 400 
ST for different primary transmission power PP. dPST=4 m, dSS=2 m, dSPR=dPP-dPST, dSME=dSPR, dPME=dPP. The 401 
antenna number N=4. 402 
 403 
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The Figure 5 shows the secrecy rate of the primary system corresponding to the ST’s initial 404 
energy for different primary transmission power. In this figure, we can observe that the secrecy 405 
rates of the primary system with both the schemes are close with the increase of the ST’s initial 406 
energy, which further illustrates the proposed scheme is superior to the ZF scheme. Specifically, 407 
the proposed scheme outperforms the ZF scheme in a lower primary power range. However, 408 
in the higher initial primary power range, the gap of the secrecy rates of the primary system 409 
between the proposed scheme and the ZF scheme gets small. Therefore, the proposed scheme 410 
in this paper is more effective when the initial energy is small. 411 
 412 
Figure. 6: The transmission rate of the secondary system with respect to the primary transmission power PP. 413 
PST0=10dB. dPST=4 m, dSS=2 m, dSPR=dPP-dPST, dSME=dSPR, dPME=dPP. The antenna number N=4. 414 
 415 
Figure 6 shows the achievable rate of the secondary system with respect to the primary 416 
transmission power. From the figure, the throughput of the secondary system with both the 417 
scheme are enhanced with the increase of the primary transmission power, which because of 418 
more energy will be harvested for the signal transmission. In the meanwhile, the propose 419 
scheme outperforms the ZF scheme, which verifies the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. 420 
V. Conclusions 421 
This paper studied the secure transmission problem for the cognitive radio-based IoMT with 422 
energy harvesting when the sensitive medical data send from the PT can be listened by a 423 
malicious eavesdropper. For the sake of protecting the security of the sensitive data, we formula 424 
the corresponding optimization problem and propose a novel algorithm for jointly designing 425 
optimal EH duration and secure beamforming vectors to maximizing the primary secrecy 426 
transmission rate while ensuring the transmission requirement of the secondary system. In fact, 427 
the number of eavesdroppers may usually more than one, the proposed scheme still can be 428 
utilized to obtain optimized beamforming vectors. The numerical results presents excellent 429 
secure transmission performance with proposed scheme than zero-forcing scheme, which can 430 
be implemented into the IoMT devices to effectively protect the security of the sensitive data. 431 
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